conceptual inquiry regarding meaning » value
The A-phase addresses the domain of practical activity. Particular actions occur over a finite amount of time, and to the extent that actions are practical, they're purposive (futurally-oriented) within specific (historically-conditioned) contexts. A practical action is valuable/good to the extent that it actively fulfills its purpose, and particular purposes are valued over others given their (historically-conditioned) contexts. Practical activity itself is evaluative—a form of valuing—reconciling what is already valued with what is valuable. The evaluating is dialogical/hermeneutic in nature, interpreting the meaning of that which is presented (in the foreground) in terms of our background (history), as directed toward (future) possibilities. A-phase terms are thus arranged in accordance with the following temporal structure:
| A | value | |
| T | valuable | the good = valuable/good (in itself) |
| S | authenticity = valuable/good for me, my 'ought' | |
| Y | morality = valuable/good for us, our 'ought' | |
| Q | valuing | will do = commitment to valuing |
| U | happening = currently valuing (evaluating), allowing, doing | |
| Z | can do = capable of valuing | |
| R | valued | character = valued by me, my 'is' |
| X | culture = valued by us, our 'is' | |
| V | nature = valued (in itself) | |
It only makes sense to speak of value in a specific type of context. Value is determined with respect to the context. The specific type of context is the type in which something can either be more of less favorable, preferred or dispreferred, better or worse, etc. So, by contrast, it's conceivable that there are contexts in which things are simply different—neither better nor worse or more or less favorable. Take, for example, objectivity vs. subjectivity. We can't say one is better than the other in themselves. True, at times one is called for more than the other, but as ways of knowing, neither can exist without the other; they're interdependent. But in other cases, something can be better or worse. A knife is better for cutting than a hammer, but worse at pounding. Things are better or worse with respect to some end within a temporal context.
Value is determined with respect to some end. That which helps something to achieve its end is valuable. It has value now, but, more importantly, it will continue to have value in the future. That's what it means for something to be valuable. Contrast this with something that simply is valued. Pleasure, for example, is valued in itself. There's a quality about it that we approve of, by definition, and so we can't help but value it. But is seeking pleasure for its own sake valuable? More often than not, the answer to that is no. Pursuing short-lived pleasures, for example, can distract us from achieving longer lasting pleasures. And longer lasting pleasures usually come as a consequence of having pursued something else.
What is valued is a matter of disposition, yet we might be disposed to self-destruction. So what is valued may not in fact be valuable. Again, what is valuable will continue to serve something with respect to achieving its end (in the future). What is valued is what one already tends to favor. And this is associated with the past—what have we favored habitually, either my nature or nurture or through deliberate effort. What we are valuing is associated with the present and what is happening, including what we're doing and what we're allowing to happen.
